A Northern District Federal Judge had this to say about a claim of sexual orientation under Title VII:
These arguments seem to this Court to misapprehend the nature of animus towards people based on their sexual orientation, actual or perceived. Such animus, whatever its origin, is at its core based on disapproval of certain behaviors (real or assumed) and tendencies towards behaviors, and those behaviors are disapproved of precisely because they are deemed to be “inappropriate” for members of a certain sex or gender. “[G]ay people, simply by identifying themselves as gay, are violating the ultimate gender stereotype—heterosexual attraction. Since there is a presumption and prescription that erotic interests are exclusively directed to the opposite sex, those who are attracted to members of the same sex contradict traditional notions about appropriate behavior for men and women.” Anthony E. Varona & Jeffrey M. Monks, En/Gendering Equality: Seeking Relief Under Title VII Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 7 Wm.
Case 1:16-cv-00054-MW-GRJ Document 19 Filed 06/20/16 Page 25 of 29 & Mary J. Women & L. 67, 84 (2000) (internal citations and quo-tations omitted). “Just as the impermissible discrimination in [Price Waterhouse] was directed at the plaintiff for being a woman who transgressed gender norms by acting masculinely, a gay woman who is discriminated against for being a woman who acts masculinely by having the traditionally male trait of being attracted to women is being discriminated against on the basis of a sex stereotype.” Cody Perkins, Comment, Sex & Sexual Orientation: Title VII After Macy v. Holder, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 427, 442 (2013) (emphasis added). Whether the person treated differently is otherwise—that is to say, his or her sexuality aside—in conformance with gender stereotypes does not render the disparate treatment lawful. When a “traditionally masculine” gay man is fired because he is gay, that firing is no less because of sex than when an “effeminate” gay man is fired. This view—that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is necessarily discrimination based on gender or sex stereo-types, and is therefore sex discrimination—is persuasive to this Court, as it has been to numerous other courts and the EEOC. See Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7–8 (“Sexual orientation discrimination also is sex discrimination because it necessarily involves discrimination based on gender stereotypes.”); see also Videckis, 2015 WL 8916764, at *7 (“Stereotypes about lesbianism, and sexuality in general, stem from a person’s views about the proper roles of men and women—and the relationships between them.”). It also follows naturally from (though it is not compelled by) Brumby, which is binding Eleventh Circuit precedent. Simply put, to treat someone differently based on her attraction to women is necessarily to treat that person differently because of her failure to con-form to gender or sex stereotypes, which is, in turn, necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex.
There you have it friends, now we can move on cases involving sexual orientation discrimination.